Submarine cable sabotage risk: companies launch new solutions in the Indo-Pacific
The Taiwanese authorities have charged this month the Chinese captain of the cargo ship Hong Tai 58 of damaging an underwater communication cable connecting the island to the Penghu archipelago, located near the Chinese coast.
This case is a clear example of how sabotage of submarine cables - an activity that is difficult to prove - is now an integral part of 'grey area' tactics, aimed at identifying and exploiting adversaries' weaknesses.
The Taiwanese coast guard had already detained the Hong Tai 58 - a Togolese-flagged ship with a Chinese crew - at the end of February. A similar incident had occurred north of Taiwan in January, involving a Hong Kong-owned commercial vessel in that case.
This year, Taiwan has already recorded five cases of damage to submarine cables, compared to three annual cases in both 2023 and 2024. In response, the coast guard has compiled a blacklist of around 100 suspicious ships, all with links to China.
A growing threat
Despite Beijing's official denials, some observers believe that this sabotage is part of Chinese coercive strategies against Taiwan.
During a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee US Senator Jacky Rosen (D-Nev.) denounced China's 'reckless, coercive and aggressive activities', pointing to the sabotage of submarine cables as a 'particularly alarming tactic'.
At the same hearing, Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of the US Navy's Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), confirmed the existence of sabotage attempts around Taiwan.
A few weeks after the seizure of the Hong Tai 58it emerged that the Chinese Naval Scientific Research Centre had patented a deep-water device capable of cutting through even the most fortified communication or power cables.
In the event of a large-scale conflict, one of China's priorities would be to isolate Taiwan, compromising civil and military communications.
In his address to Congress, Admiral Paparo indicated two strategies to counter these sabotages:
- Intelligence and rapid interventionintercept damage attempts through monitoring and targeted action.
- ResilienceCreate redundant communication networks and develop constellations of satellites in low earth orbit to ensure continuity of communications.
The private sector's response
The private sector is also responding to this new threat.
Saab Australia aims to support governments in protecting submarine infrastructure through advanced mine countermeasure technologies. The company offers autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) and seabed sensors that can monitor infrastructure in real time. Among the solutions presented are the remotely operated vehicle Work-Class (wWROV)which can be controlled by satellite up to a depth of 5,500 metres, and theAUV Sabertoothcapable of continuous operation thanks to an underwater docking station.
In France the azeinda Exail obtained a contract with the French Ministry of Defence to build AUVs capable of operating at depths of up to 6,000 metres. These systems, scheduled for delivery by 2027, will be able to autonomously reschedule ongoing missions if suspicious activity is detected.
Thales Australia focuses instead on technology Blue Sentrywhich uses towed thin-line arrays for both surface and underwater threat detection. The system is designed to identify and track anomalous contacts using an advanced sensor network.
Maritime surveillance and integrated threat response
The protection of critical submarine infrastructure, such as communication and power cables, requires a multi-level approach based on the integration of advanced technological capabilities and a continuous and structured maritime surveillance system.
Among operational solutions, the use of Automatic Identification of Ships (AIS) systems is a key tool for real-time monitoring of maritime routes and activities. Such systems enable the detection of any deviations from authorised routes, immediately activating alert mechanisms and allowing rapid intervention by the competent authorities.
Strengthening maritime domain awareness is strategic to anticipate and counter anomalous or suspicious behaviour that could threaten the integrity of submarine infrastructure.
An effective analysis and reaction capability makes it possible to prevent hostile actions before significant damage occurs, or to intervene promptly after an unlawful action, ensuring a coordinated handling of the incident also through international diplomatic and legal channels.
The adoption of these integrated measures is particularly relevant for island states or strategic regions with a high density of critical infrastructure, where information system resilience and communications protection are essential elements of national security and regional stability.
Published by Condoralex
Born Alessandro Generotti, C.le Maj. Parachutist on leave. Military Parachutist Patent no. 192806. 186th RGT Par. Folgore/5th BTG. Par. El Alamein/XIII Cp. Par. Condor.
Founder and administrator of the website BRIGATAFOLGORE.NET. Blogger and computer scientist by profession.
