Rubles and Recruits: The New Face of Russian Conscription
"If you die in Ukraine, your family will receive millions." In Russia it has almost become an advertising formula, a sinister and concrete promise that transforms war into an investment. In the poorest countryside, in the villages of Buryatia and Bashkiria, where the average monthly salary does not exceed 400 euros, joining the army has become the only way to financially redeem oneself. Even at the cost of one's life. In 2024, over a thousand people a day enlisted in the Russian army: pharaonic salaries and bonuses attract the poorest. But the system falters under the weight of costs.
In 2024, according to former President Dmitry Medvedev, more than 1,000 new soldiers per day they signed a contract with the Ministry of Defense: in addition 450,000 men in one year. An unprecedented turnout, which seems sufficient to compensate - according to NATO sources - the daily losses at the front, estimated at about 1,000 casualties per day.
The "war price list"
The numbers speak for themselves. Those who sign a volunteer contract (the so-called contracts) receives a one-time 2.3 million rubles (approximately 24,600 euros), to which are added monthly salaries from 210,000 rubles (2,250 euros) and additional bonuses for every frontline action. It reaches 500 euros for each day of offensive, or for each kilometer conquered. The downing of a Leopard or Abrams tank is worth 5.300 euros, the capture of a Western medium can yield 10,600 euros. What if you die? The equivalent of 143,000 euros is paid to the family of the fallen: almost 28 Years of Salary for a Teacher from Buryatia.
In Moscow, the capital so far spared from the direct effects of the conflict, the rush to recruit has resumed with force: over 6,300 new volunteers in the first months of 2025 alone, aided by the fear that the truce could cause the promised rewards to vanish. The state has opened collection points in the metro stations and multiplied the incentives. In regions such as Bashkiria, the 3.4 million rubles (almost 37,000 euros) of initial bonuses, more than triple the average annual income.
An unsustainable model?
Behind this mechanism is a financial machine that is increasingly under pressure. According to an analysis by German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), in 2024 alone recruitment absorbed about 2 billion rubles per day ($22 million), of which 1.5 billion (18.3 million) to be paid by regional budgets. Some local republics are allocating nearly 3% of their annual budget to enlist, risking financial collapse — as happened in the Samara region, where the one-time bonus had reached 42,000 euros.
Meanwhile, the Russian sovereign fund, the National Wealth Fund, has shrunk dramatically: from initial liquid reserves of over 140 billion dollars in 2022, today there are still some left only 40 billion, the lowest since 2008. According to George Barros, an analyst at the Institute for the Study of War, "the system has worked for two and a half years, but now it is starting to break down." This system is not destined to last. Despite the impressive numbers for 2024 - over 440,000 new kontraktniki - experts warn that the recruitment machine could jam within 12-16 months
Yet, Moscow continues to prepare for a long war, not only against Kyiv, but against the West. The defense budget has doubled in 2024, reaching 108 billion euros, 28% of public spending and over 7% of GDP, if secret items are included. With these funds, the Russian army aims to reach 1.5 million troops and to create 16 new divisions and 14 brigades. The model is no longer that of the streamlined and professional forces desired after the 2008 reform, but the return to a mass army, capable of sustaining wars of attrition.
Poverty, not patriotism
The equation is merciless. In areas where the state has failed to provide services and opportunities, war has become the only effective social policy. It is not a question of patriotism: it is mathematics. With the right price, even the life of a child can become the key to changing the fate of a family. The Kremlin has chosen not to resort to a new general mobilization to avoid protests in the cities, but the price of this “economic mobilization” could prove to be very high.
2025 will be a crucial year. If the rate of recruitment slows or resources run out, the fragile balance on which the Russian Army rests could shatter. In the meantime, families in the Russian heartland continue to sign contracts, hoping that those promised millions will not actually become coffin money.
Published by Condoralex
Born Alessandro Generotti, C.le Maj. Parachutist on leave. Military Parachutist Patent no. 192806. 186th RGT Par. Folgore/5th BTG. Par. El Alamein/XIII Cp. Par. Condor.
Founder and administrator of the website BRIGATAFOLGORE.NET. Blogger and computer scientist by profession.
