An investigation coordinated by the Naples Public Prosecutor's Office and conducted by DIGOS in synergy with AISI has once again highlighted the risks of infiltration and radicalization within institutional defense structures.
The investigation involves a 20-year-old serviceman from Naples, serving in Forlì at the "De Gennaro" barracks, home of the 66° Reggimento Fanteria Aeromobile "Trieste".
Investigative evidence and the prevention chain
The inquiry stems from an alert issued by AISI (Internal Information and Security Agency), which monitored traces of jihadist-inspired propaganda online. Analysis and digital tracing conducted by specialists led to the identification of the young soldier's online identity.
The charges considered by investigators concern glorification of terrorism, aggravated by the use of computer and telecommunications tools. According to the reconstruction:
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Online activity: The serviceman allegedly shared multimedia material glorifying terrorist organizations such as al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State (Daesh), celebrating leading figures in global jihadism.
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Home and personal searches: DIGOS Naples executed search warrants, seizing digital devices (smartphones, PCs, storage media) for forensic examination.
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Findings at the barracks: During searches conducted at the 66° Reggimento facilities in Forlì, investigators found and seized a black flag linked to ISIS, kept in a drawer and previously used by the young man for graphic challenges and photographs.
The Defense General Staff and senior commands were promptly informed in order to implement the related disciplinary and facility-security measures.
As investigative sources emphasized, the case remains at the preliminary investigation stage.The devices and material seized will undergo technical analysis; the suspect's criminal liability must be established in the appropriate judicial venues, in accordance with the presumption of innocence.
What Is the Insider Threat: the Counter-Intelligence Perspective
The case involving the 66° Reggimento brings the discussion back, at the doctrinal level, to the politico-military concept of Insider Threat (internal threat).
In the intelligence and Force Protection field, an insider threat is defined as an individual who exploits authorized access — physical or logical — to an organization's facilities, computer networks, weapons, or classified information to harm national security, carry out sabotage or espionage, or facilitate hostile and terrorist entities.
Insider vulnerability vectors generally fall along three main lines:
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Ideological and Radicalization: Conscious or gradual adherence to extremist narratives (Jihadism, supremacism, subversion).
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Coercive or Economic: Pressure exerted by foreign intelligence services or non-state actors through blackmail, financial vulnerabilities, or addiction.
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Cyber (Cyber Insider): The use of one's own credentials to steal or compromise the Defense information estate.
The Phenomenon in Operational Theaters: the Afghanistan Lesson (Green-on-Blue Attacks)
While in the domestic garrison context, the insider threat mainly manifests itself through covert radicalization and propaganda, in high-intensity operational theaters it has represented one of the most complex tactical and strategic challenges.
The most systematic and dramatic example occurred during the ISAF/Resolute Support mission campaign in Afghanistan.
In NATO terminology, color codes identify the forces in the field:
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Blue: International coalition forces (NATO and allies).
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Green: Local security forces (Afghan National Army - ANA, and Afghan National Police - ANP).
Green-on-Blue attacks (or Insider Attacks) occurred when members of the Afghan armed forces or police — or infiltrated Taliban insurgents wearing government uniforms — turned their weapons on NATO coalition trainers and soldiers during training activities (Partnering/Mentoring), joint patrols, or inside operational bases (FOB - Forward Operating Bases).
Triggering Causes in Asymmetric Theaters
CI (Counter-Intelligence) analysis conducted by allied forces in Afghanistan showed that Green-on-Blue attacks stemmed from three key factors:
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Planned Infiltration: Hostile actors (Taliban, Haqqani Network) recruited individuals to place in Afghan academies or recruitment centers for the sole purpose of carrying out attacks.
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In-Service Radicalization: Regularly enlisted soldiers who became progressively radicalized due to influence propaganda or losses suffered among their family members.
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Cultural Misunderstandings and Grievances: Personal tensions, everyday friction, or perceived affronts to religious/cultural values, exploited by ideological subversion.
Relevance to Armed Forces Security
The incident recorded in Forlì highlights how radicalization dynamics and the asymmetric threat are not confined to overseas operational theaters, but require constant monitoring of recruitment processes and the conduct of personnel in service.
Integrated coordination among security intelligence (AISI), the investigative branches of the Police Forces (DIGOS, Servizio per il Contrasto all'Estremismo e al Terrorismo Esterno), and the military security structures of the Stato Maggiore della Difesa constitutes the essential bulwark for promptly identifying early warning signs (left of launch) and safeguarding the integrity and security of the Republic's institutions.
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