New details are emerging about the military partnership between Russia and China, a relationship that goes far beyond the joint exercises known to the public. According to confidential documents hacked by the group Black Moon, Moscow is reportedly providing training and advanced equipment to the airborne forces of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The Financial Times revealed a dossier that, if confirmed, would strengthen the idea of a strong military alliance between the two countries, with significant consequences on global geopolitical balances.
Hacked documents: what they reveal
The files, dating back to the period 2023-2024, have been analyzed by the Center for Defence Reforms in Kyiv and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London. The documents speak of military supplies sufficient to equip an entire Chinese airborne battalion, interoperable command and control systems with common codes and signals to Moscow and Beijing, contracts that include joint training sessions in Russia and China. The delivery of 37 BMD-4M amphibious combat vehicles, 11 Sprut-SDM1 self-propelled guns, and 11 BTR-MDM troop transports is mentioned, along with programs to train three groups of 20 Chinese specialists on Russian command systems. According to analysts, this package reflects China's desire to test different equipment in line with the strategy of transforming the PLA into an increasingly modern and “intelligentized” force.
According to Oleksandr Danylyuk (RUSI), the training closely mirrors the tactics used by Russia for the conquest of Crimea (2014): unidentified paratroopers to secure strategic airports, rapid infiltration operations followed by reinforcements transported by air, and combined use of electronic warfare, cyberattacks, and drones to destabilize the enemy. A scenario that could be replicated in the future against Taiwan, where the terrain and lack of wide beaches make amphibious landings particularly complex; in that context, airborne forces would assume a crucial role.
Tactics and technologies in the field
The documents describe in detail some operational innovations. The “train-drop” systems involve procedures and equipment that allow vehicles — even armored or light self-propelled ones — to be sequentially dropped along a prepared runway, enabling aircraft to quickly unload material and depart without prolonged stops. The idea is to maximize the pace of logistical and tactical insertion, reducing the aircraft's window of vulnerability over the target.
Another key element is the “Dalnolyot” parachutes, ram-air canopy designed for long-distance clandestine insertions and at high altitude. They allow HALO/HAHO profiles with delayed openings, ensuring gliding ranges of tens of kilometers. These systems reduce the need to bring the aircraft close to the landing point and lower the risk of interception.
Units infiltrated with such parachutes would be tasked with conducting sabotage operations against logistical nodes, command centers, and especially enemy air defenses, with the aim of creating corridors useful for subsequent landings or insertions. These capabilities, already observed in Crimea, are now being studied by Chinese planners as part of a Joint Island Landing Campaign, a set of coordinated tactics (airborne insertions, sabotage, amphibious operations) designed to reduce the risks of a direct landing on heavily defended islands.
What are the “Dalnolyot”
The term refers to an advanced military parachute system, developed in the Soviet era and still used today by Russian special forces. It is a ram-air parachute with a surface area of around 30–33 m² and a glide ratio greater than 4 (L/D ≥ 4), sized to support significant operational masses. The system's mass (harness + pack) is approximately ≤ 21 kg, with a total operator + load mass that can reach up to ~190 kg. The system is designed for delayed openings (typically 3–10 seconds) via a stabilizing parachute.
There are also cargo versions, with front containers of ~50 kg for transporting materials or supplies. The declared operational altitudes range from ~1,200 to 8,000 m, with compatible launch speeds up to ~350 km/h; under favorable conditions, the glide can cover distances between 30 and 60 km ("best case" values, highly dependent on wind and takeoff mass).
Employment techniques: HALO, HAHO, and stand-off profiles
The Dalnolyot can be employed in HALO (High Altitude Low Opening) mode, with low opening to reduce radar and visual traceability, or in HAHO (High Altitude High Opening) mode, which exploits the glide to cover large horizontal distances to the programmed landing point. Both profiles require advanced training in canopy navigation, use of GPS waypoints, and encrypted radio coordination procedures.
There is also the cargo stand-off mode, where a container attached to the harness allows for the delivery of sensitive materials to targeted points without bringing the aircraft close to the target.
Tactical implications and use scenarios
The ability to infiltrate small teams tens of kilometers from the launch point opens scenarios ranging from advanced reconnaissance to sabotage of critical infrastructure. The Dalnolyot also allows for striking logistics centers and radar sites to facilitate the arrival of subsequent landings, or to prepare operational areas for an amphibious action. However, the effectiveness of such operations depends on a well-coordinated support chain: accurate intelligence, suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), persistent ISR, and reinforcement logistics. Without these elements, inserted units risk being quickly detected and neutralized.
Technical limitations and vulnerabilities
The theoretical performance of the Dalnolyot is strongly conditioned by weather conditions: headwinds, turbulence, or sudden changes can drastically reduce the glide range and landing accuracy. Load management presents challenges related to centering, imbalance, and the structural limits of the harness when carrying a lot of equipment.
Moreover, electromagnetic and optical detection (radar, drones, SIGINT) can intercept entry corridors or glide paths; EW countermeasures and stealth solutions are difficult to effectively apply to a parachute. Finally, operational sustainability is critical: even if a single drop is successful, consolidating the bridgehead requires reinforcements and logistics that often cannot be immediately guaranteed.
Strategic assessment
The Dalnolyot system represents an advanced technological response to the problem of long-distance insertion: wing canopies, reinforced harnesses, and HALO/HAHO procedures reduce the direct exposure of the aircraft. However, the more "pushed" numbers — such as the glide range of tens of km or high cargo capacity — should be read as theoretical values or obtained under ideal conditions; in real operational practice, these results can be strongly limited by wind, mass, and the presence of enemy countermeasures.
The real effectiveness of a program integrating Dalnolyot-type drops on a large scale depends on synchronization with SEAD/ISR and the ability to provide reinforcements and logistics to those landing; lessons learned from the Russian experience (Hostomel) remind us that technological superiority during insertion does not replace the need for airspace control and a robust and well-protected consolidation plan.
An increasingly close partnership
The cooperation between Moscow and Beijing is not new: since the 1990s, Chinese officers have been studying in Russian academies, and until a few years ago Moscow was the main arms supplier to Beijing. In the last ten years, however, the collaboration has transformed into something more structured: common command systems, regular intelligence exchange and periodic military consultations. According to Joshua Arostegui (China Landpower Studies Center, US Army War College): “When it comes to understanding how the Russians manage the command and control of complex operations, China is willing to pay a lot to obtain that information and those systems.”
Conclusions
If confirmed, these revelations show how military cooperation between Russia and China is taking on increasingly organic and structured characteristics, going well beyond the simple sharing of experiences or the sale of armaments. Rather, it outlines a strategic partnership, in which Moscow transfers know-how, operational doctrines, and advanced systems, while Beijing integrates these skills into its own military modernization process.
The strengthening of the airborne capabilities of the PLA, made possible by Russian assistance, represents an element that could radically change regional balances. In particular, the adoption of technologies such as the Dalnoyot parachute, combined with joint training programs and the acquisition of air transport armored vehicles, brings China closer to the possibility of conducting complex infiltration and sabotage operations in support of potential amphibious actions.
For the West, and especially for the countries directly involved in the security of the Indo-Pacific area, this scenario increases concerns: the hypothesis of a conflict over Taiwan becomes more plausible, not only due to Beijing's growing capabilities but also because of the political and technical support that Moscow seems intent on providing. Such a synergy, if consolidated, could represent a destabilizing factor on a global scale, strengthening the Sino-Russian axis and reducing the deterrence margins of Western democracies.
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