



Russia and China, growing military alliance: Moscow trains Chinese Paratroopers

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New details are emerging about the military partnership between **Russia** and **China**, a relationship that goes far beyond the joint exercises known to the public. According to confidential documents hacked by the group **Black Moon**, Moscow is reportedly providing training and advanced equipment to the airborne forces of the **People's Liberation Army (PLA)**. The *Financial Times* revealed a dossier that, if confirmed, would strengthen the idea of a strong military alliance between the two countries, with significant consequences on global geopolitical balances.

Hacked documents: what they reveal

The files, dating back to the period **2023-2024**, have been analyzed by the **Center for Defence Reforms** in Kyiv and the **Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)** in London. The

documents speak of military supplies sufficient to equip an entire Chinese **airborne battalion**, **interoperable command and control systems** with common codes and signals to Moscow and Beijing, contracts that include **joint training sessions** in Russia and China. The delivery of **37 BMD-4M amphibious combat vehicles**, **11 Sprut-SDM1 self-propelled guns**, and **11 BTR-MDM troop transports** is mentioned, along with programs to train three groups of 20 Chinese specialists on Russian command systems. According to analysts, this package reflects China's desire to test different equipment in line with the strategy of transforming the PLA into an increasingly modern and **“intelligentized”** force.

According to **Oleksandr Danylyuk** (RUSI), the training closely mirrors the tactics used by Russia for the conquest of **Crimea (2014)**: unidentified paratroopers to secure strategic airports, rapid infiltration operations followed by reinforcements transported by air, and combined use of **electronic warfare**, **cyberattacks**, and **drones** to destabilize the enemy. A scenario that could be replicated in the future against **Taiwan**, where the terrain and lack of wide beaches make amphibious landings particularly complex; in that context, **airborne** forces would assume a crucial role.

Tactics and technologies in the field

The documents describe in detail some operational innovations. The **“train-drop” systems** involve procedures and equipment that allow vehicles — even armored or light self-propelled ones — to be sequentially dropped along a prepared runway, enabling aircraft to quickly unload material and depart without prolonged stops. The idea is to maximize the pace of logistical and tactical insertion, reducing the aircraft's window of vulnerability over the target.

Another key element is the **“Dalnolyot” parachutes**, ram-air canopy designed for **long-distance clandestine insertions** and at **high altitude**. They allow **HALO/HAHO** profiles with delayed openings, ensuring gliding ranges of tens of kilometers. These systems reduce the need to bring the aircraft close to the landing point and lower the risk of interception.

Units infiltrated with such parachutes would be tasked with conducting **sabotage operations** against logistical nodes, command centers, and especially **enemy air defenses**, with the aim of creating corridors useful for subsequent landings or insertions. These capabilities, already observed in Crimea, are now being studied by Chinese planners as part of a **Joint Island**

Landing Campaign, a set of coordinated tactics (airborne insertions, sabotage, amphibious operations) designed to reduce the risks of a direct landing on heavily defended islands.

№ 序号	Наименование 名称	Эскиз 图片
1	Устройство установочно- амортизирующее 缓冲装置	

An armored combat vehicle, part of the files hacked by the Black Moon group

What are the “Dalnolyot”

The term refers to an **advanced military parachute system**, developed in the Soviet era and still used today by Russian special forces. It is a **ram-air parachute** with a surface area of around **30-33 m²** and a glide ratio greater than **4 (L/D ≥ 4)**, sized to support significant operational masses. The system's mass (harness + pack) is approximately **≤ 21 kg**, with a **total operator + load mass** that can reach up to **~190 kg**. The system is designed for **delayed openings** (typically **3-10 seconds**) via a stabilizing parachute.

There are also **cargo versions**, with front containers of **~50 kg** for transporting materials or supplies. The declared operational altitudes range from **~1,200 to 8,000 m**, with compatible launch speeds up to **~350 km/h**; under favorable conditions, the glide can cover distances between **30 and 60 km** ("best case" values, highly dependent on wind and takeoff mass).


4	Парашют основной парашютной системы площадью 32,5м ² 32.5 平米主伞	
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Image taken from files hacked by the Black Moon group: the main parachute of the “Dalnoyot” system, with a surface area of 32.5 m², used by Russian special forces for long-range and high-altitude insertions

Employment techniques: HALO, HAHO, and stand-off profiles

The **Dalnolyot** can be employed in **HALO (High Altitude Low Opening)** mode, with low opening to reduce radar and visual traceability, or in **HAHO (High Altitude High Opening)** mode, which exploits the glide to cover large horizontal distances to the programmed landing point. Both profiles require advanced training in **canopy navigation**, use of **GPS waypoints**, and encrypted radio coordination procedures.

There is also the **cargo stand-off** mode, where a container attached to the harness allows for the delivery of sensitive materials to targeted points without bringing the aircraft close to the target.



Technical diagram of a drogue parachute, found in files hacked by the Black Moon group, designed to reduce descent speed

Tactical implications and use scenarios

The ability to infiltrate small teams tens of kilometers from the launch point opens scenarios ranging from **advanced reconnaissance** to **sabotage of critical infrastructure**. The Dalnolyot also allows for striking **logistics centers** and radar sites to facilitate the arrival of subsequent landings, or to prepare operational areas for an amphibious action. However, the effectiveness of such operations depends on a well-coordinated support chain: **accurate intelligence, suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), persistent ISR**, and reinforcement logistics. Without these elements, inserted units risk being quickly detected and neutralized.

Technical limitations and vulnerabilities

The theoretical performance of the Dalnolyot is strongly conditioned by weather conditions: **headwinds, turbulence**, or sudden changes can drastically reduce the glide range and landing accuracy. **Load management** presents challenges related to centering, imbalance, and the structural limits of the harness when carrying a lot of equipment.

Moreover, **electromagnetic and optical detection** (radar, drones, SIGINT) can intercept entry corridors or glide paths; **EW countermeasures** and stealth solutions are difficult to effectively apply to a parachute. Finally, **operational sustainability** is critical: even if a single drop is successful, consolidating the bridgehead requires reinforcements and logistics that often cannot

be immediately guaranteed.

Strategic assessment

The **Dalnolyot** system represents an advanced technological response to the problem of long-distance insertion: wing canopies, reinforced harnesses, and **HALO/HAHO** procedures reduce the direct exposure of the aircraft. However, the more "pushed" numbers — such as the glide range of tens of km or high cargo capacity — should be read as **theoretical values** or obtained under ideal conditions; in real operational practice, these results can be strongly limited by wind, mass, and the presence of enemy countermeasures.

The real effectiveness of a program integrating Dalnolyot-type drops on a large scale depends on synchronization with **SEAD/ISR** and the ability to provide **reinforcements and logistics** to those landing; lessons learned from the Russian experience (Hostomel) remind us that technological superiority during insertion does not replace the need for airspace control and a robust and well-protected consolidation plan.

An increasingly close partnership

The cooperation between Moscow and Beijing is not new: since the 1990s, Chinese officers have been studying in Russian academies, and until a few years ago **Moscow** was the main arms supplier to **Beijing**. In the last ten years, however, the collaboration has transformed into something more structured: **common command systems, regular intelligence exchange** and **periodic military consultations**. According to **Joshua Arostegui** (China Landpower Studies Center, US Army War College): *“When it comes to understanding how the Russians manage the command and control of complex operations, China is willing to pay a lot to obtain that information and those systems.”*

Conclusions

If confirmed, these revelations show how military cooperation between **Russia** and **China** is taking on increasingly organic and structured characteristics, going well beyond the simple sharing of experiences or the sale of armaments. Rather, it outlines a strategic partnership, in which Moscow transfers know-how, operational doctrines, and advanced systems, while Beijing integrates these skills into its own military modernization process.

The strengthening of the **airborne capabilities** of the PLA, made possible by Russian assistance, represents an element that could radically change regional balances. In particular, the adoption of technologies such as the **Dalnoyot parachute**, combined with joint training programs and the acquisition of air transport armored vehicles, brings China closer to the possibility of conducting **complex infiltration and sabotage operations** in support of potential amphibious actions.

For the West, and especially for the countries directly involved in the security of the Indo-Pacific area, this scenario increases concerns: the hypothesis of a conflict over **Taiwan** becomes more plausible, not only due to Beijing's growing capabilities but also because of the political and technical support that Moscow seems intent on providing. Such a synergy, if consolidated, could represent a **destabilizing factor on a global scale**, strengthening the Sino-Russian axis and reducing the deterrence margins of Western democracies.

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