The war in Ukraine seems to have entered a new phase. Not because the conflict is nearing its end, but because it is changing in nature: it is no longer just a war of trenches, artillery, and attrition on the front. It has also become an economic, industrial, and psychological war.
For a long time, Moscow thought it could fight while keeping its territory safe from the direct consequences of the conflict. Today, this certainty appears much more fragile. Ukrainian drones strike refineries, chemical plants, fuel depots, and strategic Russian infrastructure.
Kiev is no longer just defending itself: it seeks to strike the system that allows Russia to continue the war. Oil, fuels, chemical industry, and logistics are not symbolic targets, but central elements of Moscow's war machine.
This is the real turning point: the war is no longer confined to the front but returns inside Russia, into its industrial plants, its public finances, and the daily lives of its citizens.

The Russian Economy Under Pressure
The Kremlin tries to downplay the difficulties. Putin has also spoken of problems related to "adverse weather" and other temporary factors. But behind these explanations lies a more serious picture: the Russian economy shows signs of increasing fatigue.
Industrial production is slowing down, GDP is no longer growing as in previous months, and military spending continues to weigh heavily on the state budget. The war costs more and more, while energy revenues are no longer enough to compensate for everything.
In Russia, political signs of concern are also beginning to emerge. Some institutional figures admit that a long war makes normal economic growth impossible. The population cannot live by consuming tanks, missiles, and bullets.
The problem for Putin is evident: so far, the war had been portrayed as a controlled sacrifice, far from the daily lives of Russians. Now, however, it enters prices, incomes, factories, fuel, and the perception of security.
When a war begins to be felt at home, even propaganda becomes less effective.

The Greatest Risk: A Russia That Feels Cornered
Precisely because it is under pressure, Russia can become more dangerous. An authoritarian power that feels cornered can react unpredictably, not necessarily rationally.
Moscow might seek a new escalation to demonstrate it is not vulnerable. This does not necessarily mean a direct attack on NATO, but the risk of hybrid actions is real: sabotage, cyberattacks, provocations at the borders, incidents in airspace, threats to the Baltic countries, or new massive bombings against Ukraine.
The danger does not arise only from Russian strength, but also from its fear of appearing weak. Putin's power is based on the image of control, stability, and inevitable victory. Every successful attack on Russian territory undermines this image.
For this reason, the current phase is extremely delicate. On one hand, Ukraine demonstrates it can strike the strategic depth of Russia. On the other, the Kremlin might be tempted to raise the level of confrontation to regain deterrence and internal consensus.
The turning point of the war does not yet coincide with peace. It could instead be the most dangerous moment: the one in which Moscow must choose whether to negotiate or risk a new escalation.
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