Robot Soldiers: The War of the Future Has Already Begun, from Ukrainian UGVs to the First Man-Machine Units

The revolution in military ground robots no longer belongs to the future. It has already begun.

We are not yet seeing platoons of armed androids advancing through city ruins, but battlefields are witnessing the growing appearance of unmanned machines capable of carrying out tasks that, until a few years ago, would necessarily have required the presence of a soldier.

They carry ammunition to the most exposed positions, evacuate casualties, conduct reconnaissance, breach obstacles, lay mines, transport explosives and, in some cases, employ machine guns, grenade launchers and other weapon systems.

The most visible change can be seen in Ukraine. In March 2026, the Ukrainian Defense Forces recorded more than 9,000 operational and logistics missions conducted using Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs). During the first three months of the year, the total had already reached nearly 24,500. In March, 167 Ukrainian units were employing ground robotic systems, compared with just 67 in November 2025.

In August, the number of logistics and evacuation missions conducted using UGVs alone reached 25,143, according to data from the DELTA system released by Ukraine's Ministry of Defense.

These figures point to a shift from experimentation to the systematic robotization of certain battlefield functions. And Kyiv is already looking further ahead: with the “Army of Robots” project, presented by Mykhailo Fedorov in late September, the stated goal is to achieve the first combat results within six months and, within a year, employ robots during the most dangerous phases of an assault without infantry being directly exposed during the initial action.

These are still objectives, not capabilities already available, but they clearly indicate the direction being taken.

However, when speaking of “robot soldiers,” the imagination inevitably turns to the humanoid: two legs, two arms, an individual weapon and artificial intelligence capable of replacing the infantryman.

The reality of 2026 is very different.

The platforms proving most useful are generally relatively low, simple and rugged vehicles, either wheeled or tracked. This choice is driven by battlefield requirements: stability, payload capacity, endurance, low cost and ease of production are now far more important than the ability to mimic human locomotion.

The point is not to build a robot that looks like a soldier. It is to build a machine that can go where it would be too dangerous to send a soldier.

This philosophy is producing a new category of systems that lies somewhere between a drone, a ground vehicle and a remotely operated weapon system.

Ukraine has become the leading laboratory

The Russo-Ukrainian war has accelerated the evolution of UGVs, just as it had previously transformed the use of FPV aerial drones.

The reason is directly linked to the proliferation of UAVs. In numerous sectors of the front, reconnaissance drones and FPVs make any movement of personnel and vehicles extremely dangerous for several kilometers behind the front line.

Delivering ammunition crates to a position, recovering a wounded soldier, or conducting an infantry rotation can mean exposing personnel and equipment to drone surveillance and near-immediate attack.

Kyiv has therefore begun progressively replacing personnel in the most dangerous missions with robotic platforms.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has set the goal of transferring up to 100% of last-mile logistics at the front to robotic systems. In the first half of 2026, contracts were planned for 25,000 UGVs, more than double the total for the entire previous year.

The number of models is also growing rapidly: in June 2026, Ukrainian authorities reported 50 new domestically produced ground platforms authorized since the start of the year, compared with about 60 throughout all of 2025.

They are not merely robotic mules.

The Zmiy Droid 12.7, authorized for use in January 2026, employs a remotely controlled Wolly weapon station with a 12.7 mm heavy machine gun and is intended for reconnaissance and combat tasks in high-intensity environments.

Other systems carry explosive charges directly against enemy positions. In September 2026, Reuters documented the activity of units from the Ukrainian 3º Army Corps using explosive UGVs, armed platforms, and logistics robots as part of a combat model increasingly integrated with aerial drones.

At the end of September, Ukraine also announced a new program to drastically accelerate the development of military robotics, with the stated goal of creating a genuine “Army of Robots”. The humanoid robots shown in presentations remain largely prospective, while conventional UGVs are already an everyday reality at the front.

Russia is also robotizing the battlefield

The transformation is not limited to Ukraine.

Russian forces are using an increasing variety of ground systems for logistics, evacuation, reconnaissance, mine emplacement and clearance, and fire support.

One of the most visible systems is the Kuryer, or Courier, a tracked platform that has appeared in numerous configurations. In 2025 and 2026, it was displayed with heavy machine guns, grenade launchers, thermobaric munitions, mine-laying systems, and mine-clearing equipment.

In March 2026, the Russian Ministry of Defense showed its logistical use in Ukraine, while experimental configurations with an 82 mm automatic mortar and rocket launcher later emerged.

In September, the Courier 2.0 also appeared, tested with a stabilized module featuring 12.7 mm NSVT and 7.62 mm PKT machine guns.

Here too, however, it is important to distinguish between demonstrations, prototypes, and capabilities actually available in significant numbers. Public information indicates that many Russian platforms remain remotely controlled and face the same problems observed on the Ukrainian front: communications, mechanical reliability, batteries, mobility, and resilience against electronic warfare.

Israel: armed robots even before the war in Ukraine

Israel has been working on unmanned ground vehicles for many years.

The Jaguar, developed by the Israel Defense Forces together with Israel Aerospace Industries, was introduced for Gaza border surveillance as a semi-autonomous system equipped with sensors, automated navigation capabilities, and armament.

IAI subsequently developed the larger REX MK II, a hybrid platform capable of carrying up to 1.3 tons and configurable for logistics, medical evacuation, intelligence, or combat.

It can integrate remotely controlled weapon systems with 7.62 mm or .50-caliber machine guns.

The Israeli approach differs from the rapid, relatively inexpensive production seen in Ukraine: technologically sophisticated platforms integrated within command, surveillance, and force-protection systems.

United States: Toward Human-Machine Formations

The United States is pursuing a different path.

The US Army's objective is not simply to introduce individual robots, but to create Human-Machine Integrated Formations, formations in which soldiers, crewed vehicles, robotic combat vehicles, drones, and autonomous systems operate within the same tactical structure.

The concept is summed up by the principle used by the US Army: “no blood for first contact”. Whenever possible, initial contact with the enemy should be handled by machines rather than soldiers.

In February 2026, Fort Benning also launched the first Robotic Autonomous Systems Leader Tactics Course, designed to prepare officers and noncommissioned officers to command formations equipped with both ground and aerial robotic systems.

An Army Research Laboratory report published on September 30, 2026, also describes an experiment in which 13 soldiers managed a formation consisting of a command vehicle, two robotic combat vehicles, a Future Vertical Lift platform, and aerial systems.

The most interesting result concerns cognitive load: during the experiment, mission complexity increased without creating an unsustainable rise in the burden on operators.

This is probably the real revolution.

Not one operator for every robot, but a small number of personnel capable of commanding numerous machines.

South Korea and Australia Prepare Combat Systems

Other countries are also moving from experimentation to procurement.

In July 2026, South Korea selected Hanwha Aerospace's Arion-SMET for the Army's unmanned ground vehicle program. The six-wheeled system can carry out transport, surveillance, reconnaissance, and combat support missions. Entry into service is planned between 2027 and 2028.

In Australia, BAE Systems is developing the ATLAS CCV, an approximately 10-ton 8x8 combat UGV.

It is no longer a small logistics robot, but a true unmanned combat vehicle, fitted in the configuration presented with a VANTAGE turret featuring a 25 mm M242 Bushmaster cannon.

In February 2026, ATLAS completed further trials, progressing from teleoperation to waypoint navigation and then to autonomous “sense and avoid” mode. Weapon employment, however, remains based on a human-in-the-loop system, with engagement decisions made by a human operator.

Europe: THeMIS leads the way

In Europe, one of the most mature programs is Estonia’s Milrem Robotics THeMIS.

The modular tracked platform can be configured for transport, CASEVAC, intelligence, combat, electronic warfare, and counter-drone missions. It has been acquired by numerous countries and has already been deployed in Ukraine.

In 2025, a configuration featuring the BURIA weapon station and a 40 mm automatic grenade launcher was tested in Ukraine. In 2026, Milrem showcased C-UAS configurations and the heavier HAVOC Robotic Combat Vehicle, an 8x8 hybrid designed to accommodate a 30×113 mm cannon, SHORAD missiles, and electronic warfare systems.

European production is also increasing: a production line opened in the Netherlands is intended to manufacture more than 100 THeMIS vehicles funded by the Dutch government for Ukraine.

And the Esercito Italiano?

Italy, too, is steadily building its own capabilities in the ground robotics sector through targeted acquisitions, trials, and operational validation activities.

In 2025, the Esercito acquired four Quadrupedal Unmanned Ground Vehicle “CESARE” systems for use in underground and compartmentalized environments.

In February 2026, the 187º Reggimento Paracadutisti “Folgore” began the operational evaluation of an electric robotic tactical hauler intended to move materiel over difficult terrain and also configurable for casualty evacuation.

In May, the Comando Valutazione e Innovazione dell'Esercito also completed a new phase of the multi-year Robotics and Autonomous Systems campaign at Monte Romano. Launched in 2022, the campaign focuses on employing robotic systems in high-intensity symmetrical combat scenarios.

The Esercito Italiano is therefore in a phase of progressive development and consolidation of ground robotic capabilities, with particular focus on mobility, logistics support, reconnaissance, and reducing personnel exposure. The next step will be to determine to what extent these experiences can evolve toward systems increasingly integrated into operational units and, in the longer term, toward platforms also intended for direct combat support.

What about humanoid robots?

This is probably the most spectacular aspect, but also the one that calls for the greatest caution.

China is investing heavily in the humanoid robotics industry, and the People's Liberation Army is studying potential military applications.

In September 2026, Reuters documented numerous Chinese programs concerning the use of humanoids for reconnaissance, logistics, hazardous environments, and even urban assault squads integrated with other robotic systems.

One project by the National University of Defense Technology envisions a possible deployment window of five to ten years.

But the artificial infantryman remains a long way off.

Energy endurance, balance, reliability, the ability to manipulate objects, damage resistance, and above all the ability to understand complex environments represent enormous obstacles. Even in China's civilian industry, humanoids in 2026 often remain dependent on programmed sequences and struggle to adapt to unforeseen events.

On the battlefield, these problems are compounded.

The real obstacle is autonomy, not the weapon

Mounting a machine gun, grenade launcher, or even a missile on a ground robot is now relatively straightforward.

Far more difficult is enabling the machine to move autonomously through rubble, trenches, woods, and craters while GPS and communications are disrupted by electronic warfare.

A human being immediately understands that a hole is too deep, a bridge will not hold, a branch blocks the way, or an apparently clear road is an ambush.

For an artificial intelligence embedded in a ground vehicle, these assessments remain far more complex.

This is why today navigation autonomy is generally more advanced than decision-making autonomy in the use of force.

In the main publicly documented Western programs, the model remains one in which humans supervise the machine and retain a role in engagement decisions.

U.S. DoD Directive 3000.09 states, for example, that autonomous and semi-autonomous systems must enable commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment in the use of force.

Meanwhile, the issue has also become international. In August 2026, the United Nations Secretary-General and the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross renewed their call for new rules on autonomous weapon systems, identifying as a major concern the possibility that machines could independently select human beings as targets.

2030 could see the first true human-machine battlefield

The most likely transformation in the coming years will therefore not be the arrival of the Terminator.

It will be far less spectacular, but militarily much more significant.

A squad or platoon could simultaneously field small reconnaissance UAVs, FPV drones, logistics UGVs, CASEVAC robots, armed platforms, electronic warfare systems, and heavier robotic vehicles.

Soldiers will continue to make decisions, but increasingly the machine will be physically exposed to risk.

The aerial drone will detect the threat. The command system will distribute the information. A UGV may advance to assess the terrain or open fire. A second robot will carry ammunition. A third will be ready to recover a wounded person.

Only afterward will infantry physically occupy the ground.

This is the direction in which ground warfare appears to be heading.

The future “robot soldier” may therefore have no face, two arms, or two legs.

It could be a small tracked platform weighing a few hundred kilograms, produced in thousands of units, linked to drones and sensors, and inexpensive enough to be lost in place of a human being.

And it is precisely this, more than the armed humanoid, that is the revolution already underway in 2026.

Sources

• Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, data on the employment of UGVs in 2026. Over 9,000 frontline missions in March

• Reuters, evolution of ground combat robots in Ukraine. Behind the killer robots of Ukraine's new warfare revolution

• U.S. Army Research Laboratory, Human-Machine Integrated Formations. Air-Ground Teaming for the Battlespace

• Esercito Italiano, testing of Robotics and Autonomous Systems. RAS Campaign at Monte Romano

• BAE Systems Australia, ATLAS Collaborative Combat Variant. ATLAS CCV

• Milrem Robotics, THeMIS family. THeMIS UGV

• Israel Aerospace Industries, REX MK II. REX MK II unmanned land vehicle

• U.S. Department of Defense, directive on autonomous weapon systems. DoD Directive 3000.09 – Autonomy in Weapon Systems

• International Committee of the Red Cross, autonomous weapon systems and international humanitarian law. Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law