An Industrial Hub for Drones in Serbia: the Turning Point Announced by Vučić

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The Serbian defense is ready to enter a **new industrial phase** with the opening of a large facility dedicated to the **production of military drones**. **President Aleksandar Vučić** has indicated a precise timeframe – **between late March and early April 2026** – explaining that Serbia will have a factory capable of producing **advanced UAVs on a large scale**, in collaboration with **a foreign partner**. The news has been picked up by **European news agencies** and **international economic media**, who agree on both the timing and the industrial, non-experimental nature of the project.

The political message accompanying the announcement is clear: **Belgrade intends to build an autonomous and continuous production capacity**, moving beyond the logic of small batches or prototypes. The conflicts of recent years have shown how **unmanned systems** are now central to military operations, from **reconnaissance** to **precision strikes**, and even **battlefield saturation**. In this context, investing in a **national supply chain** means reducing

dependence on foreign countries and ensuring **operational continuity** in the event of prolonged crises.

The identity of the **“foreign partner”** has not been made public, but Serbia's approach in recent years suggests a **pragmatic approach**: integrating **domestic industrial skills** with **mature foreign technologies**. The declared goal of deploying **tens of thousands of drones** , including **kamikaze** ones, makes it clear that the future factory is designed to support **high numbers and constant production rates**, essential prerequisites for a **military doctrine based on intensive UAV use**.

From R&D to Series: the Role of VTI and the National Industry

The presidential announcement fits into an **already initiated path**. For some time, the **Military Technical Institute (VTI)** of the Ministry of Defense has been involved in the development of **drones and loitering munitions**, in collaboration with the **national industry** . Technical analyses and sector publications confirm that several Serbian systems have now **surpassed the experimental phase**, approaching full operational maturity.

Among these, the FPV drone family **Komarac** represents one of the most well-known examples: **light loitering munitions**, designed for **direct attack** and adaptable to various **mission profiles**. Alongside small-sized systems, Serbia has also developed more robust platforms, such as the **Gavran 145**, described in technical literature as a **superior class loitering system**, designed for **armed surveillance** and **medium-range attack** missions.

Drone ""KOMARAC". Source Ministry of Defense of Serbia.

This portfolio highlights a precise choice: **covering multiple operational segments**, from **economical and numerous drones** to those with **greater autonomy and payload**. With the opening of a dedicated facility, Belgrade aims to transform these programs into a **stable industrial capacity**, capable of ensuring **serial production, standardization, and rapid updates**. It is a crucial step, as it marks the transition from the demonstrative phase to a logic of **long-term military and industrial resilience**.

Foreign Purchases, Diversification, and Regional Implications

Internal growth is accompanied by a **carefully balanced foreign acquisition policy**. The military parade on **September 20, 2025, in Belgrade**, analyzed by specialized press and research centers, clearly showed this approach: **national systems** deployed alongside **imported platforms of high technological level**. Among these, **long-endurance drones** and **rocket artillery systems** of Israeli manufacture, integrated into the process of **modernizing the Serbian Armed Forces**.

Military parade on September 20, 2025, in Belgrade. Source Ministry of Defense of Serbia.

According to analyses published by international sector publications, these acquisitions are part of **structured agreements** with the Israeli industry, aimed at quickly filling **specific operational gaps** and accelerating **training and doctrinal integration**. Added to this is cooperation with **China**, often cited by European think tanks as an example of **technological partnership** in the field of drones and sensors, with direct impacts on **reconnaissance and surveillance** capabilities.

Overall, a coherent strategy emerges: **buy abroad what is immediately available and tested**, while building at home the capacity to **mass-produce and quickly adapt systems** to operational needs. In an area like the **Balkans**, where tensions have not disappeared and military competition remains a relevant factor, the future drone factory represents **much more than an industrial investment**. It is a **signal of strategic ambition** and a desire to position itself as a **credible actor in contemporary technological warfare**, with potential effects of **deterrence and regional rebalancing** in the medium term.

News link: https://www.analisidifesa.it/2026/01/un-polo-industriale-per-la-produzione-di-droni-in-serbia/